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ABSTRACT
This article describes ways to enhance the efficiency of anti-tax base erosion measures 
aimed at preventing transnational corporations (TNCs) from shifting their profits 
from home countries to lower-tax jurisdictions. The research methodology comprises 
a set of mathematical models applied for a comprehensive analysis of tax planning 
methods used by TNCs and the counter-methods used by national governments. The 
models with postulated equilibrium consider tripartite financial structures (consist-
ing of a parent company, a subsidiary in a loyal jurisdiction and an affiliate in an 
offshore jurisdiction) based on the principle of economic equilibrium in the distribu-
tion of incomes of different jurisdictions. The models are parametrized by using the 
data on tax regimes in different jurisdictions. The computational experiment focused 
on the tax regimes of a parent jurisdiction (Russian Federation), a typical loyal juris-
diction (Laos) and a typical offshore jurisdiction (British Virgin Islands). Thus, we 
considered the most important cases in international taxation regarding TNCs’ eco-
nomic interests and the national welfare of the parent jurisdiction. The experiment 
tested the efficiency of different methods of fiscal regulation of international income 
and capital flows and showed that although the rules of controlled transactions are 
considered crucial for countering tax planning, they fail to bring the desired results 
in contemporary economic reality characterized by expanded international network 
of financial structures and accelerated growth of digital transactions. Based on our 
research findings, we formulated the following recommendations. The governments 
of parent jurisdictions are recommended to extend the rules of controlled transactions 
and controlled foreign corporations not only to offshores but also to loyal jurisdic-
tions. For the Russian government, it may be effective to test and adopt the rules of 
secondary adjustments in combination with the rules of controlled transactions and 
controlled foreign corporations, to lower the rate of the tax on foreign dividends and 
to make the unreturned foreign dividends exempt from the additional tax should 
they be repatriated to Russia. Enhanced international cooperation in this sphere can 
maximize the efficiency of these measures. 
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АННОТАЦИЯ
Целью статьи является обоснование мер налоговой политики, способных 
успешно противодействовать утечке доходов и капиталов за рубеж и содей-
ствовать их возврату в национальную экономику. Методика исследования 
базируется на комплексе математических моделей международного нало-
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гообложения. Это модели с постулируемым равновесием, в которых рассма-
триваются трёхсторонние финансовые структуры (с участием дочерней ком-
пании в лояльной юрисдикции и аффилированной компании в офшорной 
юрисдикции), построенные по принципу экономического равновесия дохо-
дов территорий. Предложены авторские модели, позволяющие анализиро-
вать в комплексе, как методы налогового планирования транснациональных 
корпораций, так и методы противодействия им со стороны правительств, 
оцениваемые с позиций национального благосостояния. Для практического 
применения разработанного подхода выполнена параметризация моделей 
с использованием данных о налоговых режимах, действующих различных 
юрисдикциях. В вычислительном эксперименте использованы налоговые ре-
жимы материнской юрисдикции (Российская Федерация), типичной лояль-
ной юрисдикции (Лаос), и типичной офшорной юрисдикции (Британские 
Виргинские острова). Эксперименты заключались в анализе наиболее важ-
ных ситуаций, возможных в международном налогообложении с позиций 
экономических интересов ТНК и с позиций национального благосостояния 
материнской юрисдикции. В рамках экспериментов были проверены эффек-
тивность и конечные результаты применения различных методов налогово-
го регулирования международных потоков доходов и капиталов. Результаты 
математического моделирования, показали, что правила контролируемых 
сделок – фундаментальные для противодействия налоговому планированию 
транснациональных корпораций – плохо работают в условиях разветвлён-
ной международной сети финансовых структур и быстрого роста цифровых 
трансакций. Исходя из полученных результатов, предложено: распростране-
ние правил контролируемых сделок и контролируемых иностранных компа-
ний на лояльные юрисдикции, а не только на офшоры; апробация и введение 
в РФ правил вторичных корректировок в связке с правилами контролируемых 
сделок и контролируемых иностранных компаний; снижение ставки налога 
на дивиденды, получаемые из-за рубежа; освобождение от дополнительного 
налога на невозвращённые дивиденды в случае их возврата в РФ. Кроме того, 
сделан вывод о том, что повышение эффективности указанных мер требует 
углубления международного сотрудничества в этой сфере.
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА
международное налогообложение, математическое моделирование, трансна-
циональная корпорация, налоговое планирование, контролируемая сделка, 
контролируемая иностранная компания, вторичная корректировка
1. Introduction
National economic development is 
affected considerably by the movement 
of funds belonging to transnational cor-
porations (TNCs). The Fourth Industrial 
Revolution, commonly described as the 
new era of cyberphysical systems, with 
augmented reality merging the digital 
and physical worlds, makes the struggle 
for profits, capitals and places of capital 
deployment even more severe. Developed 
countries seek to move their knowledge-
intensive manufacturing activities back 
home (the so-called “reshoring”) [1], while 
developing countries of the “workshop 
of the world” try to retain and increase 
their productive capacities as well as their 
profits and capitals. Countries involved in 
trade wars, which often disguise deeper 
rivalries in technology and innovation 
[3; 4], resort to fiscal policy methods. 
One of the most recent examples is 
Donald Trump’s tax reform [4], which, 
among other things, included tax cuts to 
corporate profits with the maximum cor-
porate income rate lowered from 35% to 
21%, tax free repatriation of dividends 
from foreign subsidiaries and a one-time 
mandatory tax imposed on deferred for-
eign income, which wasn’t previously 
taxed in the US [5]. These measures are 
aimed at reducing the benefits of tax plan-
ning and encourage companies to bring 
their overseas earnings back to the United 
States [6].
Yet another example is the ongoing 
tariff war between the USA and China [7], 
which may have a negative impact not 
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only on these countries’ economies but 
also lead to a 0.5% output decline in the 
world by mid-2021 [8]. 
Accelerated development of the 
digital economy intensifies cross-border 
activities involving intangible assets, us-
ers of computer networks and business 
functions, which makes companies less 
dependent on local staff and more flexible 
in terms of where they place their servers 
and other elements of infrastructure1. All 
of the above not only leads to an increased 
risk of tax evasion2 [9] but can also signifi-
cantly affect the basic principles underly-
ing the efficiency of public finance systems 
in general [10]. 
Fiscal methods have a considerable 
impact on international flows of capitals 
and incomes [11–13] and they need to be 
further improved in order to deal with 
the problems of tax base erosion and tax 
avoidance, especially in developing coun-
tries and emerging markets. 
The alarming recent decline in in-
vestment into the Russian economy (the 
current level of investment is about 20% 
of GDP while the required minimum is 
25%3) has rendered the anti-base erosion 
measures particularly important. 
This problem is exacerbated by the 
increasingly sophisticated techniques of 
tax planning used by TNCs. The results 
of TNCs’ tax planning efforts, on the one 
hand, and governments’ measures intend-
ed to curtail tax base erosion, on the other, 
are quite unpredictable. The methods of 
ex-post analysis and statistical analysis 
are not suitable in this situation and more 
complex tools of mathematical modelling 
are required that would enable us to make 
ex-ante calculations and work out the pos-
sible scenarios in this sphere of economic 
relations [12; 14–18].
1 OECD. BEPS Action 1: Address the Tax 
Challenges of the Digital Economy. Public Dis-
cussion Draft / OECD. 2014. 24 March–14 April, 
pp. 33–34.
2 France Stratégie. Taxation and the digital 
economy: A survey of theoretical models. Final 
report. 2015. February 26.  56 p.
3 President of Russia. President's Address to 
the Federal Assembly. 2018. Available at: http://
kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957
One of the seminal works in this field 
is the fundamental study of the impact of 
taxes on direct foreign investment con-
ducted by W.S. Clark for the OECD [12]. 
This study presents a set of mathematical 
models based on the average and mar-
ginal effective tax rates. These models 
describe various tax planning strategies 
used by TNCs and show the outcomes 
of different corporate income reform 
scenarios, in particular their impact on 
the flows of direct foreign investment. 
American economist Harry Grubert, one 
of the world’s foremost experts in the 
area of international taxation [14; 15], ap-
plied mathematical models to show how 
multinational corporations used intellec-
tual property to avoid taxes through tax 
planning schemes. He also assessed the 
impact of royalties on effective tax rates. 
M. P. Devereux and R. G. Hubbard [16] 
proposed enhanced versions of the tra-
ditional models of taxation of capital in-
come on foreign direct investment, based 
on the analysis of marginal investment 
projects and marginal effective tax rates. 
Q. Hong and M. Smart [18] discuss opti-
mal taxation in the context of tax havens 
and describe a general equilibrium model 
to assess the impact of TNCs’ tax planning 
on optimal corporate tax rates and direct 
foreign investment. Nevertheless, as the 
OECD experts point out, the problem is so 
complex that “more work should be done 
to investigate the implications of tax plan-
ning to forward-looking effective tax rate 
analysis used to infer tax reform effects on 
FDI, in particular, by developing the ideas 
of H. Grubert” [12, p. 23].
The currently used tools of mathemati-
cal modelling require further development 
and improvement in order to keep up with 
the rapid transformations of international 
economic relations and tax regimes, which 
is particularly important if we want to 
handle the problem of TNCs’ tax planning 
practices in the digital economy. There-
fore, the aim of this article is to identify the 
tax regimes capable of efficiently counter-
ing tax avoidance and tax base erosion by 
applying methods of mathematical model-
ling specially adjusted to account for this 
new economic reality. 
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The article is structured as follows. 
The next section presents the research 
methodology and shows the difference 
between the proposed approach and 
those applied in previous studies. The 
third section contains the statement of 
the research problem and describes the 
implementation of the proposed set of 
mathematical models. The fourth sec-
tion describes the results of mathemati-
cal modelling and provides the economic 
interpretation of the computational ex-
periments. The fifth section is devoted to 
the discussion of the research results. In 
the final section of the paper, some rec-
ommendations are provided concerning 
the necessary adjustments to the national 
fiscal policy in order to maximize its effi-
ciency in countering tax base erosion and 
profit shifting.
2. Research methodology
There is a variety of mathematical 
models to choose from depending on the 
research question one needs to address: 
for instance, to evaluate the efficiency of 
different alternatives of economic policy. 
 For the purpose of this study, math-
ematical models can be divided into the 
following categories:
– according to the way of approach-
ing economic equilibrium – models with 
computable4 [12, pp. 155–181; 16; 19] and 
postulated equilibrium [14; 17; 20; 21];
– according to the types of financial 
structures – models of bipartite or direct, 
non-intermediated holding structures 
[12, p. 123; 20; 21]; models of tripartite 
structures (involving intermediaries, usu-
ally registered in a tax haven)5 [12, p. 129];
– according to the types of economic 
equilibrium – models of tax rate equilib-
rium [20; 21], models of corporate income 
equilibrium [14; 19]; and models of equi-
librium in jurisdictions’ incomes [19].
4 OECD. Addressing Base Erosion and Prof-
it Shifting (Russian version). OECD. OECD Pub-
lishing; 2013. DOI: 10.1787/9789264201262-ru
5 OECD. Addressing Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting (Russian version). OECD. 
OECD Publishing; 2013, pp. 91–100. DOI: 
10.1787/9789264201262-ru
In order to solve our research prob-
lem – to describe the national taxation re-
gime which will be able to deal efficiently 
with the problem of tax planning and the 
tax base erosion – we are going to use the 
models with postulated equilibrium that 
consider tripartite financial structures, 
that is, the structures including affiliates 
in offshores (Fig. 1), and equilibrium in 
the distribution of incomes across differ-
ent jurisdictions. 
 
 
 
Parent 
company
Country A
Affiliated 
company
Tax haven C
Subsidiary
Country B
Royalty
Investment in 
intangible assets 
(cost distribution)
Credits
Share acquisition
Intangible assets (licences)
Dividends
Interest
Royalty
Figure 1. Illustration of a tripartite TNC 
structure with a subsidiary and a tax 
haven affiliate
Source: OECD (2007). Tax Effects on Foreign Direct 
Investment. Recent Evidence and Policy Analysis. 
OECD Tax Policy Studies, No. 17, p. 129.
We have chosen this model type be-
cause in this study we don’t aim to justify 
investment decisions and tax optimization 
from the standpoint of economic entities. 
Otherwise we would have to take into ac-
count such factors as time and place, which 
are crucial for their decision-making. This 
study focuses on the general principles of 
national policy-making in the sphere of 
international taxation of TNCs and thus 
is aimed at tackling the problem of tax 
base erosion and profit shifting. The new 
tax regime should be well adapted to the 
“new normalcy” of international econom-
ic relations, that is, increased competition 
for capitals and a wider range of ways of 
tax avoidance due to the proliferation of 
cross-border transactions involving digi-
tal goods and services. 
The proposed approach draws from 
the ideas and mathematical models de-
veloped by renowned specialists in this 
sphere (D.W. Jorgenson [22; 23], J. Whal-
ley [20; 24], M.P. Devereux [16; 25]; and 
H. Grubert [14; 15; 26; 27]). The main dif-
ference between the proposed approach 
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and its counterparts (see, for example, 
[14; 20; 21]) is that it considers not only the 
methods of tax planning applied by TNCs 
but also the methods of counteracting 
tax planning applied by national govern-
ments (including secondary adjustments)6 
[25]). Furthermore, the outcomes of differ-
ent policies are assessed not only regard-
ing the interests of economic entities and 
tax authorities but also the interests of 
national economies in general (by taking 
into account the movement of capitals and 
revenues) and national welfare. 
3. Description of the models
To realize the above-described meth-
odological approach, we propose a set of 
models ranging from the simple to com-
plex ones: we shall start from the math-
ematical description of the economic re-
lations of ordinary companies belonging 
to two jurisdictions and finish with com-
plex schemes of interactions of resident 
companies belonging to jurisdictions of 
three different types (ordinary, loyal and 
offshore). In doing this, we are going to 
take into account the diverse methods of 
tax planning applied by TNCs and the 
methods of counteracting tax planning 
applied by national governments. Tax 
evasion schemes involving corruption, 
smuggling and other criminal offences 
are not going to be considered or mod-
elled in this study.
3.1. Statement of the research problem
There are three tax jurisdictions (three 
countries): a parent jurisdiction, A; a loyal 
jurisdiction (with liberal anti-offshore leg-
islation), B; and a tax haven (offshore ju-
risdiction), C.
There is also a certain TNC – a par-
ent company and a resident of territory A 
(rA)(which is, by default, the territory of 
the given country), where this company 
operates. 
This parent company has a subsidiary 
(the parent controls more than a half of the 
subsidiary’s stock) on the territory of loyal 
6 EY. Transfer pricing secondary adjust-
ments. HMRC consultation. London: Ernst & 
Young LLP; 2016.
jurisdiction B and an affiliated company 
on territory C. The subsidiary also has an 
affiliate on territory C. Territory C is used 
for concealing income and tax evasion by 
the residents of jurisdictions A and B rath-
er than for any real economic activities. 
Proceeding from this assumption, we 
have built a range of scenarios: from the 
simplest (basic) to more realistic ones, 
taking into consideration various meth-
ods of tax planning and the correspond-
ing countermeasures. The basic scenario 
involves a bipartite financial structure 
while more complex and, therefore, more 
realistic scenarios, tripartite financial 
structures. 
3.2. Basic scenario. Model of a bipartite 
financial structure investing in fixed assets 
The parent company has invested in 
fixed assets of its subsidiary by purchas-
ing its shares (S). The profit obtained by 
the subsidiary on territory B is repatriated 
in the form of dividends to territory A.
Scenario description:
a) The profit of the parent company in 
territory A is subject to taxation with the 
effective tax rate tAA applied in territory A.
b) The profit of the subsidiary in terri-
tory B is taxed at the effective tax rate tBB 
applied in territory B.
c) The profit of the subsidiary left once 
the taxes on territory B are paid is repatri-
ated in the form of dividends to territory 
A and is subject to the repatriation taxes 
on dividend payments at the rate tSBAB ap-
plicable in jurisdiction B.
d) The profit repatriated in the form 
of dividends to territory A is subject to the 
repatriation taxes on dividend payments 
at the rate tSBAA applicable in parent juris-
diction A (in cases when A applies the 
residence principle).
e) If jurisdiction A applies the ter-
ritoriality principle, then tSBAA = 0 (but in 
this case royalty and interest are usually 
taxed).
f) If the dividends are not repatriated, 
then tSBAB = 0 (but jurisdiction A, according 
to the residence principle, can charge a tax 
at the rate of tSBAA on the profit remaining 
in jurisdiction B in order to stimulate the 
repatriation of dividends).
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The above-described and following 
notations are based on the principles de-
scribed below (Fig. 2):
Sign
of tax t
Jurisdiction 
charging 
tax M
Type
of taxable 
income X
Recipient 
jurisdiction
of income LSource
of income K
tXKLM
Figure 2. The general format of notations 
in the formulae 
(tax rates are used here as an example)
The main formula of the basic scena-
rio is as follows:
(1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (1 )
(1 )(1 ).
BAB BAA
BAB BAA
A AA B BB
B BB S B BB S
B BB S S
D t D t
D t t D t t
D t t t
− = − −
− − − − =
= − − −   (1)
This expression allows us to assess 
the impact of national tax policies on the 
behaviour of TNCs. When we plug the ac-
tual tax rates of different jurisdictions into 
formula (1), we can find in which jurisdic-
tion (in this case A or B), the company’s 
income net of taxation will be higher and, 
therefore, which jurisdiction will be more 
profitable for this company’s business. 
If governments do not interfere into ac-
tivities of economic entities (tax rates are 
0%), then we are dealing with a situation 
of economic equilibrium – investment is 
equally beneficial in any of the jurisdic-
tions (DA = DB).
3.3. Complex scenario.  
Model of a tripartite financial structure 
shifting profits into a tax haven 
This is an expanded model taking into 
account tax planning methods (transfer-
ring a part of the income to tax haven C 
through a resident company in loyal ju-
risdiction B) and counter-measures: con-
trolled transactions (CT) and application 
of the arm’s length principle; controlled 
foreign corporations (CFC); and second-
ary adjustments (SA) (for more on second-
ary adjustments7).
7 EY. Transfer pricing secondary adjust-
ments. HMRC consultation. London: Ernst & 
Young LLP; 2016.
Its general formula (in a compressed 
form) looks the following way:
,
AB
BA CB
p pa
A CA S AC
p pa
S BA S BC
D D D F
D D D F
+ + + =
= + + +  (2)
where ,
BA
a a
A SD D  are the net of tax incomes 
from the active business operations of the 
parent and its subsidiary on territories A 
and B respectively;
,
CB
p p
CA SD D  are the net passive incomes 
(presented separately due to the peculiari-
ties of their taxation) of the parent and its 
subsidiary from affiliates in jurisdiction C;
,
AB
p p
BA SD D  are the net passive incomes 
obtained by the parent and its subsidiary 
from each other;
,AC BCF F  are the total “grey” incomes 
(both active and passive) shifted by the 
parent and its subsidiary to offshore ju-
risdiction C net of taxes on repatriation of 
passive incomes.
Each element of formula (2), in its 
turn, has its expanded expression:
1. Net incomes from active business 
operations of the parent company and its 
subsidiary in territory A ( aAD ) includes the 
income from territory C ( aACD ) net of the 
“grey” income shifted to offshore jurisdic-
tion C ( aACF ) and the taxes paid in territory 
A ( aACT ) plus the money saved through tax 
planning ( aACT
+), with consideration to the 
counter-measures taken by the national 
government ( , ,
ACA ACAACA R I
ϕ ϕ ϕ∆ ∆ ∆ ):
{ (1 )}
{ ( )}
{[ (1 )] }
{ ( ) },
AB AB CA CA
AC AC
AB AB CA CA
ACA ACA
a a a a a
A AC AC AC AC
A R I R I
A AC A R I
A R I R I AA
A ACA AA A R I AA
D D F T T
D d d d d
D D
D d d d d t
D t D t
ϕ ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ ϕ
+
= − − + =
= − − − − −
− + + −
− − − − − +
+ ∆ + ∆ + ∆
where 
ABR
d  is the income (not from active 
operations) in the form of royalties (R) re-
ceived in territory А from territory В;
ABI
d  is the interest income (I) received 
in territory А from territory В; 
CAR
d  is the income paid in the form 
of royalties (R) from territory А to terri-
tory С;
CAI
d  is the interest income (I) from ter-
ritory А to territory С;
, ,
AC ACAC R I
ϕ ϕ ϕ  are the “grey” incomes 
moved by the TNC to jurisdiction C by un-
(3)
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derstating the market cost of goods (trans-
fer pricing), overstating the royalties paid 
for the use of intangibles and credit inter-
ests respectively; 
ACA AC ACAϕ ϕ ϕ∆ = −  are the net “grey” 
incomes shifted by the TNC to jurisdic-
tion C by understating the market cost 
of goods after country A has introduced 
measures to counter tax planning ( ACAϕ );
ϕ ϕ ϕ∆ = −
ACA AC ACAR R R  are the net “grey”’ 
incomes shifted by the TNC to jurisdiction 
C by overstating royalty payments for in-
tangibles after country A has introduced 
measures to counter tax planning (
ACAR
ϕ );
ACA AC ACAI I I
ϕ ϕ ϕ∆ = −  are the net “grey” 
incomes shifted by the TNC to jurisdiction 
C by overstating credit interest payments 
after country A has introduced measures 
to counter tax planning (
ACAI
ϕ ).
2. The net (of tax) income from active 
business operations of the parent and its 
subsidiary in loyal jurisdiction B looks the 
following way:
[ ]
[ ] [ ]
{ (1 )}
{ }
{[ (1 ) ]
[ ]}
{[ (1
BA
BAB BAB BAA BAA
BA BA CB CB
BC BC
BA BA CB CB
BCB BCB
BA
a a a a a
S BC BC BC BC
a a a a
S S S S
B R I R I
B BC B R B I
B R I R I BB
B BCB BB B R BB B I BB
B R
D D F T T
T T T T
D d d d d
D D D
D d d d d t
D t D t D t
D d
ϕ ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ ϕ
+
+ +
= − − − −
− − − − =
= − − − − −
− + + −
− − − − − −
− ∆ + ∆ + ∆ −
− − )(1 ) ]
[ (1 ) (1 )
(1 ) ]}
{[ (1 )(1 ) ]
[ (1 ) (1 )
(1 )
BA CB CB BAB
BAB BCB BAB
BCB BAB
BA BA CB CB BAA
BAA BCB BAA
BCB
I R I BB S
B BCB BB S B R BB S
B I BB S
B R I R I BB S
B BCB BB S B R BB S
B I BB S
d d d t t
D t t D t t
D t t
D d d d d t t
D t t D t t
D t t
ϕ ϕ
ϕ
ϕ ϕ
ϕ
− − − − −
− ∆ − + ∆ − +
+ ∆ − −
− − − − − − −
− ∆ − + ∆ − +
+ ∆ − ]}.
BAA
3. The net passive income obtained by 
the parent from its affiliate in an off-shore 
jurisdiction C is as follows:
[ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
{ } { }
{ }
{ }.
CA CA CA CA CA CA
CA CA CA CA
CA CAA CA CA CAA CA
p p p p
CA CA CA CA
I R I R
CA CA CA CA
I R I R
CA CA CA CA
R I R R I I
I I R R
I I I R R R
D D F T
D D F F
T T T T
D D D D
D t D t
D t D t
ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ
+ +
= − − =
= + − + −
− + + + =
= + − + −
− + +
+ ∆ + ∆
4. The net passive income obtained by 
the subsidiary from the affiliate in an off-
shore jurisdiction C is as follows:
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
{ }
{ }
{
CB
CB CB CB CB
BAB BAB BAB BAB
CB CB CB CB
BAA BAA BAA BAA
CB CB CB CB CB CB
CB CB CB CB
CB
p I R I R I R
S CB CB CB CB CB CB
I R I RI R
CB CB S S S S
I R I R
S S S S
I R I I R R
I I R R
I
D D D F F T T
T T T T T T
T T T T
D D D D
D t D t
D
ϕ ϕ
ϕ
+ ++ +
+ +
= + − + − + +
+ + − + + + −
− + + + =
= + − − −
− + +
+ ∆ }
{[( ) ]
[( ) ]}
{[( ) ]
[( ) ]}
{[( ) ]
[(
CBB CB CB CBB CB
CB CB CB CB CBB BAB
CB CB CB CB CBB BAB
CB CBB CB BAB
CB CBB CB BAB
CB CB CB CB CBB BAA
CB CB CB
I I R R R
I I I I I S
R R R R R S
I I I S
R R R S
I I I I I S
R R R
t D t
D D t D t
D D t D t
D t t
D t t
D D t D t
D D t
ϕ
ϕ
ϕ
ϕ
ϕ
ϕ
+ ∆ −
− − − ∆ +
+ − − ∆ +
+ ∆ +
∆ −
− − − ∆ +
+ − ) ]}
{[( ) ]
[( ) ]}.
CB CBB BAA
CB CBB CB BAA
CB CBB CB BAA
R R S
I I I S
R R R S
D t
D t t
D t t
ϕ
ϕ
ϕ
− ∆ +
+ ∆ +
+ ∆
5. The net passive income obtained by 
the parent from its subsidiary:
[ ] [ ]
{ }
{ }.
BA BA
BAB BAB BAA BAA
BA BA BA BAB BA BAB
BA BAA BA BAA
p I R
BA S S
I R I R
I R I R
I R I I R R
I I R R
D D D
T T T T
D D D t D t
D t D t
= + −
− + − + =
= + − + −
− +
6. The net passive income obtained by 
the subsidiary from its parent: 
[ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
{ } { }
{ }
{ (1
AB AB
AB AB BAB BAA
AB AB
ABA ABA ABB ABB
BAB BAB BAA BAA
AB AB AB ABA AB ABA
AB ABB AB ABB
AB ABA AB
p p p p p p
S S ABA ABB S S
I R
S S
I R I R
I R I R
I R I R
S S S S
R I I I R R
I I R R
R R R
D D T T T T
D D
T T T T
T T T T
D D D t D t
D t D t
D t t
= − − − − =
= + −
− + − + −
− + − + =
= + − + −
− + −
− − − )
(1 ) }
{ (1 )
(1 ) }.
B BAB
AB ABA ABB BAB
AB ABA ABB BAA
AB ABA ABB BAA
S
I I I S
R R R S
I I I S
t
D t t t
D t t t
D t t t
+
+ − − −
− − − +
+ − −
7. The overall amount of the active 
and passive “grey” incomes shifted by the 
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
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parent to offshore jurisdiction C net of re-
patriation taxes on passive incomes:
[( )]
[( ( ) )]
{[ ]
( )}
{ } { }.
ACA ACA
AC AC
AC ACA AC ACA
CA CA CA CA
p pa
AC AC ACA CA
a I R I R
AC I R CA CA
A AC A R A I
A R R A R R
I I R R
F F T F
F T T F F
D D D
D t D t
D D
ϕ ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ
= − + =
= − + + + =
= + + −
− + +
+ +
8. The overall amount of the active 
and passive “grey” incomes shifted by the 
subsidiary to offshore jurisdiction C net of 
repatriation taxes on passive incomes:
[( )]
[( ( ) )]
{[ ]
( )}
{ } { }.
BCB BCB
BC BC
BC BCB BC BCB
CB CB CB CB
a I R
BC BC CB CB
m I R I R
BC I R CB CB
B BC B R B I
B R R B R R
I I R R
F F F F
F T T F F
D D D
D t D t
D D
ϕ ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ
= + + =
= − + + + =
= + + −
− + +
+ +
Unlike the basic model, this model 
allows us to consider tax planning in all 
its complexity, including a subsidiary reg-
istered in a loyal jurisdiction and having 
connections with a tax haven. Moreover, 
with the help of this model we can find 
out which methods of countering such 
sophisticated tax planning strategies are 
likely to be most efficient. 
3.4. Complex scenario focused on national 
welfare. Model of a tripartite financial 
structure with incomes previously shifted  
to a tax haven
The above-described scenarios con-
sidered models of tax equilibrium re-
garding the interests of economic entities. 
However, national economies comprise 
not only private but also public enterpris-
es financed by taxes. It is obvious that the 
interests of the states are much wider than 
those of private economic entities and, 
therefore, require us to take into account 
the tax revenues of national governments. 
If we formulate our research question 
in such a way, the logic of mathemati-
cal modelling will change: while in the 
above-described models we focused on 
corporate income equilibrium regardless 
of the jurisdiction (and, therefore, regard-
less of which jurisdiction will benefit from 
these assets), now we are going to look at 
the situation from the perspective of the 
national interests of jurisdiction A by tak-
ing into account the global incomes of a 
multinational corporation accumulated 
within this jurisdiction (including “grey” 
incomes) as well as tax revenues T of ju-
risdiction A.
In this case, the economic equilibrium 
model will consider the equilibrium of 
incomes of different territories and the in-
comes of territory A will be calculated the 
following way: 
( )
,
BA CB AB
c
ABC
p p pa a
A S S S BA
p c c
CA ABC ABC
D T
D D D D D
D T T +
+ =
= + + + + +
+ + −  (11)
where cABCD  is the income from three ter-
ritories (as distinct from the previous sce-
narios, which took into account only the 
company’s income from the territory of its 
registration and tax haven C);
, ,
BA CB AB
p pa
S S SD D D  are the dividends ob-
tained by the parent from its subsidiary 
(from active business operations – 
BA
a
SD ; in 
the form of passive income – ,
CB AB
p p
S SD D ).
Taxes T charged by state A include 
taxes on incomes from territories A, B and 
C and on incomes repatriated to jurisdic-
tions B and C ( cABCT ), reduced by the sums 
of payments saved by TNCs as a result of 
tax planning ( cABCT
+ ):
[( ) ( )
( )] [( )
(( ) ( )
( ) ( )]
[( ) ( )],
ACA ACA
ABA ABA BAA BAA
CB CB CB CB
BAA BAA BAA BAA
AB AB BA BA
BAA BAA BAA BAA
c c
ABC ABC
a a I R
AC AC I R
I R a a
I R S S
I R I R
S S S S
I R I R
S S I R
I R I R
CA CA CA CA
T T T
T T T T
T T T T
T T T T
T T T T
T T T T
+
+
+
+ +
+ +
= − =
= − + + +
+ + + − +
+ + − + +
+ + + + +
+ + − +  (12)
where aACT  signifies the tax revenues of 
jurisdiction A from the active business op-
erations of the parent company; 
a
ACT
+  means the losses in tax revenues 
of jurisdiction A from active business op-
erations of the parent company and the 
passive operations when incomes are 
shifted from jurisdiction A to offshore ju-
risdiction C as a result of tax planning;
,
ACA ACA
I R
I RT T  are the tax revenues of 
jurisdiction A in the form of taxes on re-
(9)
(10)
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patriated passive income (interests and 
royalties) when the income is paid from 
jurisdiction A to offshore jurisdiction C;
,
ACA ABA
I R
I RT T  are the tax revenues of juris-
diction A in the form of taxes on repatriat-
ed passive income (interests and royalties) 
when the income is paid from jurisdiction 
A to loyal jurisdiction B;
BAA
a
ST  means the tax revenues of juris-
diction A in the form of the tax on divi-
dends from the subsidiary’s active busi-
ness income;
BAA
a
ST
+  stands for the losses in tax rev-
enues of jurisdiction A in the form of 
taxes on dividends from the subsidiary’s 
income from active and passive opera-
tions when the income is paid from loyal 
jurisdiction B to offshore jurisdiction C as 
a result of tax planning;
,CB CB
BAA BAA
I R
S ST T  are the tax revenues of juris-
diction A in the form of taxes on dividends 
from passive operations when the income 
is paid from offshore jurisdiction C to loy-
al jurisdiction B; 
,CB CB
BAA BAA
I R
S ST T
+ +  are the losses in tax rev-
enues of jurisdiction A in the form of taxes 
on the subsidiary’s passive income when 
the income is paid from offshore jurisdic-
tion C to loyal jurisdiction B as a result of 
tax planning; 
,AB AB
BAA BAA
I R
S ST T  are the tax revenues of ju-
risdiction A in the form of taxes on the 
income from passive operations when the 
income is paid from jurisdiction A to loyal 
jurisdiction B; 
,BA BA
BAA BAA
I R
I RT T  are the tax revenues of juris-
diction A in the form of taxes on passive 
income (interests, royalties) when the in-
come is paid from loyal jurisdiction B to 
jurisdiction A; 
,I RCA CAT T  are the tax revenues of juris-
diction A in the form of taxes on passive 
income (interests, royalties) when the in-
come is paid from loyal jurisdiction C to 
jurisdiction A;
,I RCA CAT T
+ + are the losses in tax revenues 
of jurisdiction A in the form of taxes on 
passive income (interests, royalties) when 
the income is paid from offshore jurisdic-
tion C to jurisdiction A;
[ (1 )] ;
AB AB CA CA
a
AC A R I R I AAT D d d d d t= − − − −
( ) ;
ACA ACA
a
AC A ACA AA A R I AAT D t D tϕ ϕ ϕ+ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆
; ;
ACA AC ACA ACA AC ACA
I R
I A I I R A R RT D t T D tϕ ϕ= =
; ;
ABA AB ABA ABA AB ABA
I R
I I I R R RT D t T D t= =
;
;
CA CAA CA
CA CAA CA
I
CA I I I
R
CA R R R
T D t
T D t
ϕ
ϕ
+
+
= ∆
= ∆
(1 )
(1 ) ;
BAA BA BA CB CB
BAA
a
S B R I R I
BB S
T D d d d d
t t
= − − − − ×
× −
(1 )
(1 )
(1 ) ;
BAA BAA
BCB BAA
BCB BAA
a
S B BCB BB S
B R BB S
B I BB S
T D t t
D t t
D t t
ϕ
ϕ
ϕ
+
= ∆ − +
+ ∆ − +
+ ∆ −
(1 ) ;CB
BAA CB ABA ABB BAA
I
S I I I ST D t t t= − −
(1 ) ;CB
BAA CB ABA ABB BAA
R
S R R R ST D t t t= − −
( ) ;CB
BAA CB CBB CB BAA
I
S I I I ST D t tϕ+ = ∆
( ) ;CB
BAA CB CBB CB BAA
R
S R R R ST D t tϕ+ = ∆
(1 ) ;AB
BAA AB ABA ABB BAA
I
S I I I ST D t t t= − −
(1 ) ;AB
BAA AB ABA ABB BAA
R
S R R R ST D t t t= − −
( (1 )) ;BA
BAA BA BAB BAA
I
I I I IT D t t= −
( (1 )) ;BA
BAA BA BAB BAA
R
R R R RT D t t= −
; ;
CA CA CA CA
I R
CA I I CA R RT D t T D t= =
;
.
CA CAA CA
CA CAA CA
I
CA I I I
R
CA R R R
T D t
T D t
ϕ
ϕ
+
+
= ∆
= ∆
Together the models show the move-
ments of capitals and incomes inside 
the TNC structure operating in different 
countries. The company redistributes its 
incomes among these countries by using 
methods of tax planning while pursuing 
its own economic interests. An important 
factor in the TNC’s choice of strategies is 
the policy of each country in the sphere 
of international taxation (how efficiently 
their governments manage to prevent 
profit shifting). This factor determines 
changes in the international capital flows 
and, consequently, the amount and struc-
ture of taxes, performance of transnation-
al corporations, and trends in national 
welfare. 
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3.5. Implementation  
of the mathematical models
The mathematical models were cal-
culated by using spreadsheet software 
Microsoft Excel. First, we checked the 
models for adequacy (whether the model 
reacts logically to external regulators 
such as taxes, tax planning and coun-
ter-measures). Second, we designed a 
program of computational experiments 
(see Table 1) to investigate the efficien-
cy of different policy measures in this 
sphere.
The mathematical models were then 
parameterized, that is, we assigned numer-
ical values to variables. For this purpose we 
chose the countries which are of particular 
interest to the Russian Federation as trade 
partners and those that are often used for 
tax planning – loyal (Laos, Malta, and Cy-
prus) and offshore (British Virgin Islands, 
Panama) jurisdictions (Table 2). 
Table 1
Description of computational experiments and their variants
No measures 
are taken to 
repatriate 
the incomes 
shifted to 
lower-tax 
jurisdictions
Corporate 
profits
Experiment 1
CFC rules are not applied, the 
corporate income tax rate is nominal
А
В
Δ between countries А and В
Experiment 2
CFC and CT rules are applied, the 
corporate income tax rate is nominal
А
В
Δ between countries А and В
National 
welfare
Experiment 3
Analysis of the effect of CFC and 
CT rules at nominal rates of the 
corporate income tax
CFC rules are not 
applied
А
В
С
CFC and CT rules are 
applied
А
В
С
Δ for country А
Experiment 4
Analysis of the losses in tax revenues 
if CFC rules are not applied and the 
tax rates are effective
100% participation
А
В
С
20% participation 
(avoidance of CFC 
rules)
А
В
С
Δ of country А
Measures 
are taken to 
repatriate 
the incomes 
shifted to 
lower-tax 
jurisdictions
Corporate 
profits
Experiment 5
CFC and SA rules are not applied, 
the corporate income tax rate is 
nominal
А
В
Δ between countries А and В
Experiment 6
CFC, CT and SA rules are applied, 
the corporate income tax rate is 
nominal
А
В
Δ between countries А and В
With respect 
to national 
welfare
Experiment 7
Analysis of the effect of CFC, CT and 
SA rules if the corporate income tax 
rate is nominal
CFC and SA rules 
are not applied in 
country B
А
В
С
CFC, CT and SA
А
В
С
Δ for country А
Experiment 8
Analysis of the losses in tax revenues 
if CFC and SA rules are not applied 
and the tax rate is effective
100% participation
А
В
С
20% participation 
(avoidance of CFC, 
CT and SA)
А
В
С
Δ for country А
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As a result, for our computational 
experiments we selected Russia as a par-
ent jurisdiction, Laos as a typical loyal 
jurisdiction for opening subsidiaries, and 
the British Virgin Islands (BVI) as a typi-
cal offshore jurisdiction. Instead of these 
countries we could have used any other 
countries corresponding to the given 
types of jurisdictions since in this case 
what matters is not the intricacies of tax 
legislations of specific countries but the 
key factors that determine TNCs’ behav-
iour and efficient policies in the sphere of 
international taxation.
The purpose of our experiments was 
to analyze the most relevant situations 
in international taxation, first regarding 
TNCs’ economic interests and then, re-
garding the national welfare of the parent 
jurisdiction. The series of experiments also 
tested the efficiency of such key methods 
of tax regulation of international capital 
flows as CT, CFC and SA in different situ-
ations and in different combinations.
4. Modelling results and discussion
The results of the computational ex-
periments are shown in Table 3. 
This table contains the description 
of each experiment and the economic in-
terpretation of its results (regarding cor-
porate economic interests and national 
welfare) as well as the information about 
the net (of taxes) incomes allocated to dif-
ferent jurisdictions and the difference (Δ), 
which is used to check the profitability 
of investment, including the net income, 
taxes and “grey” incomes shifted to an 
offshore. 
4.1. Efficiency of controlled transactions 
(CT) rules
When the government resorts to such 
tough measures as CT rules, it may be 
detrimental to the economic interests of 
TNCs (see Experiment 1 in Table 3). 
As the results of our computational 
experiments have shown, when CT rules 
are not applied to the subsidiary, the net 
income of the parent in home jurisdiction 
(39.6 units) is slightly lower than the in-
come of its subsidiary in Laos (46.0 units), 
which means that the parent company in 
Russia may be economically motivated 
to establish a subsidiary in a loyal juris-
diction (Laos) and use it for its economic 
activities – debit and credit operations. It 
thus makes sense for the TNC to engage 
in tax planning and benefit from the op-
portunities provided by the offshore ju-
risdiction (BVI) even though the nominal 
rate of the corporate income tax in juris-
diction B (24%) is higher than in jurisdic-
tion A (20%). 
It should be noted that the more ef-
ficiently the rules are enforced, the less 
income is left to the company in the par-
ent jurisdiction since these funds are re-
distributed in the form of tax revenues 
for the benefit of the government. Conse-
quently, the TNC becomes interested in 
avoiding the CT rules through expanding 
its activities in the loyal and offshore ju-
risdictions to the detriment of the parent 
jurisdiction. For the government, CT rules 
may turn into a source of problems since 
instead of the extra tax revenues the result 
might be the shrinking tax base and tax 
revenue losses. This result appears even 
more disappointing from the perspective 
of national welfare since the country risks 
losing capitals (which may entail losses of 
jobs, production outputs and so on) and 
tax revenues. 
There is yet another important point 
worth considering. As far as intangible as-
sets are concerned, CT rules usually prove 
to be ineffective since accelerated digitali-
zation has been changing the principles of 
price-setting, which means that TNCs will 
always find ways of shifting a part of their 
income and avoiding taxes through trans-
fer pricing of intangibles. 
4.2. Efficiency of controlled transactions 
and controlled foreign corporation rules 
(CT+CFC)
For TNCs the introduction of CFC 
rules in addition to CT rules (Experi-
ment 2 in Table 3) increases the negative 
effect since, if these rules are imposed on 
the subsidiary in the loyal jurisdiction, the 
offshore company will be also subject to 
these rules. The result is the fall in the sub-
sidiary’s income (redistributed in the form 
of taxes for the benefit of the parent juris-
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Table 3 
Results of the computational experiments for the cases of Russia 
(parent jurisdiction A), Laos (loyal jurisdiction B) and the BVI (offshore C)
Scenarios Total 
Total income
net 
incomes taxes
“grey”
incomes
total
includ-
ing 
divi-
dends
total
in-
clud-
ing tax 
saving
total
includ-
ing repa-
triated 
incomes
N
o 
m
ea
su
re
s 
ar
e 
ta
ke
n
 to
 r
ep
at
ri
at
e 
th
e 
in
co
m
es
 s
h
if
te
d
 to
 
lo
w
er
-t
ax
 ju
ri
sd
ic
ti
on
s
C
or
p
or
at
e 
p
ro
fi
ts
Experiment 1 
А 77.6 39.6 0.0 –22.4 0.0 38.0 –2.0
В 85.0 46.0 45.6 –24.6 9.6 39.0 –1.0
Δ between А and В –7.4 –6.4 –45.6 2.2 –9.6 –1.0 –1.0
Experiment 2
А 77.6 39.6 0.0 –22.4 0.0 38.0 –2.0
В 63.1 24.1 23.7 –36.9 0.0 39.0 –1.0
Δ between А and В 14.5 15.5 –23.7 14.5 0.0 –1.0 –1.0
N
at
io
n
al
 w
el
fa
re
Experiment 3
without CFC
А 63.0 40.0 0.0 23.0 0 38.0 –2.0
В 60 45.6 45.6 14.4 –9.6 39.0 –1.0
С 77.0 77.0
CT and CFC
А 84.9 40.0 0.0 44.9 0.0 38.0 –2.0
В 38.1 23.7 23.7 14.4 0.0 39.0 –1.0
С 77.0 77.0
Δ for А –21.9 0.0 0.0 –21.9 0.0 0.0 0.0
Experiment 4
100% partici-
pation
А 103.8 60.0 39.6 43.8 –0.7 38.0 –2.0
В 19.2 0.0 0.0 19.2 –12.7 39.0 –1.0
С 77.0 77.0
20% participa-
tion (avoidance 
of CFC rules)
А 71.1 28.3 7.9 42.8 –0.1 38.0 –2.0
В 51.8 35.8 35.8 16.0 –10.7 39.0 –1.0
С 77.0
Δ for А 32.7 31.7 31.7 1.0 –0.6 0.0 0.0
M
ea
su
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e 
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e 
th
e 
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h
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d
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-
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x 
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ic
ti
on
s
C
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p
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at
e 
p
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Experiment 5
А 79.6 79.6 0.0 –20.4 0.0 0.0 –40.0
В 85.0 46.0 45.6 –24.6 9.6 39.0 –1.0
Δ between А and В –5.4 33.6 –45.6 4.2 –9.6 –39.0 –39.0
Experiment 6
А 79.6 79.6 0.0 –20.4 0.0 0.0 –40.0
В 62.5 62.5 62.5 –37.5 0.0 0.0 –40.0
Δ between А and В 17.1 17.1 –62.5 17.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
N
at
io
n
al
 w
el
fa
re
Experiment 7
without CFC 
and SA in B
А 101.0 80.0 0.0 21.0 0.0 0.0 –40.0
В 60.0 45.6 45.6 14.4 –9.6 39.0 –1.0
С 39.0 39.0
CFC, CT and 
SA
А 116.9 80.0 0 36.9 0.0 0.0 –40.0
В 83.1 60.1 60.1 23.0 0.0 0.0 –40.0
С 0.0 –80.0
Δ for А –15.9 0.0 0.0 –15.9 0.0 0.0 0.0
Experiment 8 
100% partici-
pation
А 141.8 100 39.6 41.8 –0.8 0.0 –40.0
В 19.2 0.0 0 19.2 –12.7 39.0 –1.0
С 39.0 39.0
20% participa-
tion (avoid-
ance of CFC 
and SA rules)
А 109.1 68.3 7.9 40.8 –0.2 0.0 –40.0
В 51.8 35.8 35.8 16 –10.7 39.0 –1.0
С 39.0 39.0
Δ for А 32.7 31.7 31.7 1.0 –0.6 0.0 0.0
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diction). In this case, the parent’s income 
in home jurisdiction will remain the same 
and will be 39.6 units while that of its 
subsidiary in Laos will fall to 24.1, which 
means that for the parent it is no longer 
feasible to open a subsidiary in a loyal ju-
risdiction, that is, CFC rules are effective 
in this case. Nevertheless, the same way 
as with CT rules, the “grey” income shift-
ed to an offshore is not affected by these 
measures and, therefore, in this case the 
government fails to prevent profit shifting 
and tax base erosion. Furthermore, if we 
look at this situation from the perspective 
of national welfare (see Experiment 4 in 
Table 3), these rules do not give any ad-
vantage to the parent jurisdiction in com-
parison with the situation when CFC rules 
are not applied since an increase in tax 
revenues is compensated by the decrease 
in the dividends from the subsidiary (re-
duced by the amount of difference be-
tween the tax calculated according to CFC 
rules and the tax paid by the subsidiary in 
the loyal jurisdiction and thus making it 
possible for the TNC to claim tax relief un-
der the double tax treaty). 
Moreover, we should remember that 
there are means and ways of dodging CFC 
rules. One of the ways widely used by 
TNCs is to reduce the de jure (on paper) 
participation of the parent in the subsid-
iary’s equity to the minimal required level 
(in Russia – 25% or less), which is detri-
mental to the national welfare of jurisdic-
tion A as the dividends are attributed and 
paid to other affiliates which buy shares 
of the subsidiary or are residents of other 
(usually offshore) jurisdictions. 
Our calculations (see Experiment 4 
in Table 3) have shown that if country A 
imposes CT and CFC rules on the subsid-
iary while the TNC tries to dodge these 
rules, the national welfare of A (the sum 
of tax revenues and net incomes) will fall 
by 32.7 units due to the drop in the net in-
come of the parent company (from 60 to 
28.3) in the form of dividends from the 
subsidiary (from 39.6 to 7.9). Losses in tax 
revenues are 1.0 units. Thus, the appli-
cation of CFC rules in combination with 
CT rules can bring some paradoxical out-
comes: instead of enhancing the country’s 
economic development through efficient 
anti-base erosion measures, the govern-
ment may fail to increase the tax revenues 
and at the same time face a massive out-
flow of capitals (due to increased hidden 
incomes in off-shore jurisdictions – in this 
case up to 77 units).
4.3. Efficiency of controlled transactions, 
controlled foreign corporation and 
secondary adjustments rules (CT+CFC+SA)
The application of CFC and SA rules 
in relation to the offshore will push TNCs 
towards moving back their now taxable 
“grey” incomes from the parent’s opera-
tions with an offshore (see Experiment 5 
in Table 3). On the one hand, if we look at 
it from the perspective of national welfare, 
it is an obviously positive result. On the 
other hand, such policy encourages TNCs 
to compensate for their losses by trans-
ferring some of their profits to offshores 
through a loyal jurisdiction. At the end of 
the day, this will mean that despite all the 
harsh anti-base erosion measures applied 
by country A in relation to the offshore, 
the schemes of tax planning will still be 
effective because the companies will be 
realizing them through their subsidiaries 
in loyal jurisdictions. In this situation, if 
CFC and SA rules are not applied to the 
subsidiary in a loyal jurisdiction, the net 
profits of the parent in Russia (79.6) will 
be considerably higher than the profits of 
its subsidiary in Laos (46.0 units), which 
means that by trying to return the hidden 
income from the parent’s operations with 
the offshore, country A increases its net 
income. From the company’s perspective, 
however, the net income of its subsidiary 
in jurisdiction B (inclusive of “grey” in-
come) is 85,0 units, which makes a slightly 
larger sum than the income of the parent 
company. Moreover, about a half of these 
funds will be accumulated in the offshore. 
In other words, if there is only one country 
engaged in the struggle (Russia) and this 
struggle is directed only against offshores, 
these efforts are doomed to failure. 
As a logical next step, the government 
of the home jurisdiction can impose CT, 
CFC, and SA rules on the parent com-
pany’s subsidiaries in loyal jurisdictions. 
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Chances are that such scheme would be 
effective because in this case the TNC will 
be unable to resort to tax planning as it is 
bound by the law in all jurisdictions. As 
Experiment 8 demonstrates, in the situa-
tion similar to that of Experiment 4, TNCs 
can take measures to counter the govern-
ment’s efforts by de jure (on paper) reduc-
ing their participation in the capital of the 
subsidiary in loyal jurisdiction B to the 
level below 25%. Therefore, the govern-
ment of country A won’t be able to impose 
CFC rules and, consequently, SA rules on 
the subsidiary.
In this case, there will be a consider-
able decline in the welfare of territory A 
(by 32.7 units) due to the fall in the net 
income of the parent company (from 100 
to 68.3). The losses in tax revenues of 
the country in question will be 1.0 units 
(41.8–40.8). Such negative effect can be 
explained by the drop in dividends paid 
by the subsidiary in loyal jurisdiction B to 
jurisdiction A (from 39.6 to 7.9).
In other words, if higher-tax parent ju-
risdiction A (Russia) has rigorous anti-off-
shore legislation, the TNC will be tempted 
to look for loopholes to avoid CFC and SA 
rules and operate through loyal jurisdic-
tions (in our case Laos) and still enjoy the 
opportunity of shifting its “grey” incomes 
to the offshore (39.0).
Thus, in this scenario, a TNC has five 
main alternatives to choose from:
1) to accept the “inevitable” and play 
by the fair rules of the parent jurisdiction;
2) to try to partially compensate for 
the losses incurred from the imposition 
of these rules, for example, by using tax 
planning schemes involving transfer pric-
ing of hard-to-value intangibles;
3) avoid these rules by reducing its 
participation in subsidiaries and affiliates 
to less than 25%, which is quite a big risk;
4) de facto reduce its participation in 
the business to less than 25%, that is, all 
but withdraw from active business;
5) leave this business altogether. 
Which alternative the TNC will go for 
depends on different factors. From the per-
spective of national welfare, the first and 
second alternatives are more preferable but 
they are not very likely to be the TNC’s first 
choice. It all depends on the impact of other 
factors, in particular how comfortable and 
convenient it is for companies to operate in 
the parent jurisdiction, whether the “rules 
of the game” are short-lived or not, how 
well protected are companies’ property 
rights, how favourable is the business cli-
mate and how low are the transaction costs 
for companies to remain competitive in the 
home market and international markets. If 
the transaction costs are too high and dam-
age the company’s performance, it will 
probably choose alternatives 3–5, which 
cannot be considered as a positive outcome 
in terms of national welfare. 
5. Conclusion
In the modern globalized economy, 
measures to counter tax base erosion and 
profit shifting to lower- or zero-tax jurisdic-
tions can often bring some unpredictable or 
contradictory results, in other words, some 
gain may also entail some loss. 
Normally, when approaching this 
problem, scholars justify the application 
of such measures in relation to TNCs by 
pointing out the revenue losses incurred 
by national governments. However, if we 
assess the efficiency of such measures not 
from the fiscal perspective but from the 
point of view of national welfare, it be-
comes evident that governments should 
proceed with extreme caution. Reduction 
of tax avoidance can be accompanied by a 
decline in business activity and the shrink-
ing national tax base, which will naturally 
hamper the country’s economic growth. 
As the results of mathematical model-
ling and computational experiments have 
shown, when seen from the perspective of 
national welfare, CT rules, meant to cur-
tail tax base erosion, fail to provide the an-
ticipated outcomes when applied within 
the extensive tax planning network, in 
particular in the conditions of accelerated 
digitalization. The same can be said about 
the combination of CT and CFC rules. All 
of the above casts doubt on the efficiency 
of the whole system of countering income 
concealment and tax base erosion used by 
national governments. 
It doesn’t follow, however, that any 
attempts to improve or develop this sys-
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tem need to be abandoned. What it means 
is that punishments and prohibitions are 
hardly a panacea, especially if there is a 
lack of coordination in the efforts of na-
tional governments on a higher, interna-
tional level. 
Therefore, the policy makers should 
be concerned not only with improving 
national mechanisms of countering base 
erosion and profit shifting (the negative 
stimuli) but, first and foremost, with cre-
ating positive stimuli – favourable condi-
tions for retaining the capital in the long 
run such as a good investment climate, 
low business transaction costs, economic 
incentives for innovation based on terri-
torial and technological principles, and 
so on. 
The Russian government seeks to ad-
dress these problems by creating stimuli 
for foreign investors, although there is still 
a long way to go in this respect since in the 
Corruption Perceptions Index Russia is at 
the bottom of the list. 
As for international economic rela-
tions, the following recommendations can 
be formulated. An efficient fiscal policy 
should be aimed at a slow, gradual change 
rather than at a radical breakthrough.
1. All the key policy measures should 
be thoroughly tested before being imple-
mented and the reactions of economic en-
tities to these measures should be moni-
tored. 
2. Another important requirement is 
transparency in tax regulation: the lack 
of transparency creates an atmosphere of 
distrust and suspicion. In this case, inves-
tors will either find ways to avoid taxes 
or leave the jurisdiction and/or business 
altogether. Therefore, a fiscal policy, in the 
way similar to a monetary policy and its 
forward guidance tool [28], should ensure 
efficient communication between the cen-
tral fiscal authorities and taxpayers about 
the future course it is going to take. 
3. It is important to enhance mutually 
beneficial international cooperation in the 
sphere of taxation based on the shared un-
derstanding of the fact that policies limited 
to one national territory cannot be effective 
in the modern globalized and digitalized 
world where cross-border transactions in-
volving digital goods and services are be-
coming widely spread as well as the use of 
loyal and offshore jurisdictions.
We would also recommend the Rus-
sian government to focus on the following 
policy areas:
1) bring CT rules for digital transac-
tions in accordance with the BEPS require-
ments8, since CT are crucial for countering 
transfer pricing – the core of tax planning;
2) extend CFC and CT rules not only 
to offshores but also to loyal jurisdictions;
3) test and introduce SA rules in com-
bination with CFC and CT rules in the 
Russian Federation;
4) lower the foreign dividend tax rate; 
introduce exemptions from the additional 
tax on unreturned dividends should they 
be repatriated to Russia; 
5) improve the mechanisms for iden-
tifying the real beneficiarity and enhance 
international cooperation in this sphere.
If such principles and recommenda-
tions are implemented, they will stimulate 
investment into Russian economy and 
stimulate the country’s socio-economic 
development in general. 
8 OECD. BEPS Action 1: Address the Tax 
Challenges of the Digital Economy. Public 
Discussion Draft / OECD. 2014. 24 March–14 
April.
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